The role of capacity in mental health lawsrecent reviews and legislation
Kris Gledhill 1
The context in which the Szmukler et al proposal is put forward is the several reviews in the different jurisdictions in the United Kingdom and in Ireland, which have led to capacity becoming a central feature in relation to civil detention in Scotland and in Ireland, and which may well lead to it becoming a central feature in Northern Ireland, though efforts to achieve the same in England and Wales were rejected.
For forensic patients, however, capacity is not prominent, and the proposal made goes further than recent legislative amendments and debates have contemplated. These are set out in the order in which they occurred: the Richardson Committee review of the English statute, then the amendments in Scotland, followed by those in Ireland (which pre-dated those in Scotland but came into effect later); next was the action that was eventually taken in relation to the English statute, and finally there are the proposals as to what to do in Northern Ireland. The latter is the only one that comes close to the proposals of Szmukler and others, which they acknowledge in their paper.
(i) The Richardson Committee
The first review was that by the Expert Committee appointed to advise the Secretary of State for Health on the Mental Health Act 1983 for England and Wales (also known as the Richardson Committee), which reported in November 1999 2 . It suggested, in a chapter on underlying principles 3 , that treatment for mental ill-health should be governed by principles similar to those relevant to physical ill-health, where patients with capacity decide whether or not to accept treatment: providing similar respect for autonomy in the mental health field was necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of mental disorder. The logic of this would be that only those without capacity could be compelled to accept treatment. However, a consultation exercise carried out by the Committee revealed that only a small minority of respondents suggested that capacity to make decisions should be the only test: the larger body of opinion favoured overriding decisions to refuse treatment by those with capacity when to do so was necessary for public 129 safety. The Committee supported this approach 4 , and so suggested that the criteria for an order for compulsory treatment 5 be phrased so that it could be met in alternative circumstances: either when the patient was without capacity and compulsory care and treatment was necessary for his or her health or safety, or to protect the patient from serious exploitation, or to protect others from serious harm; or, if the patient had capacity, when there was a substantial risk of serious harm to other persons , or possibly to the health or safety of the patient or to the safety of other persons if the patient was untreated 6 .
In relation to patients involved in the criminal justice system, the Committee noted 7 that it had made little progress in deciding the extent to which principles applicable to civil patients should be adjusted when carried across to those in the criminal justice system. This was largely for pragmatic reasons: the complexity of the panoply of existing regimes, and the lack of internal coherence; the uncertainty of government policy in relation to those with severe personality disorders 8 ; and the lack of time available to it to consider the issues involved or to discuss them with the government department most involved, the Home Office 9 . The Committee did, nevertheless, make several recommendations, including that offenders who lacked capacity and met the criteria for a compulsory order should be dealt with primarily according to their health needs 10 , that transfers be used when offenders met the civil criteria 11 , and that the criminal courts should be able to make a health order if the offender met the criteria for a civil order and lacked capacity 12 . The Committee did not conclude that those who retained capacity should be excluded from treatment, noting that "to leave in prison offenders who could benefit from treatment would not be productive of public safety" 13 ; however, there was the contrary point that hospitals and health professionals "should not be required to detain offenders who are persistently unwilling to engage in treatment or who are untreatable" 14 . The belief the Committee expressed was that mentally disordered offenders who retained capacity would probably be personality disordered and subject to a mental health order only if there was the possibility of benefit to the patient: since this would invariably depend on cooperation, it could be tested by the greater use of interim orders 15 . The Committee supported the retention of the Restriction Order regime 16 , which was described as "an essential safeguard" in the identification of "high risk cases": however, it should rest on a special risk assessment so that those dealing with the offender subsequently could know the basis for its imposition 17 .
It was some time before new legislation was forthcoming for England and Wales: it did not incorporate capacity principles and is discussed below: a more speedy process was followed in Scotland, which did put capacity as a central feature, but only on relation to civil detention.
(ii) The MacLean Committee and the Millan Committee
The Scottish Executive also established a review of its legislation, the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, by the Millan Committee, which was appointed in February 1999 and reported in January 2001 18 . There was also the MacLean Committee, more officially the Committee on Serious Violent and Sexual Offenders, which reported in June 2000 19 ; its recommendations were subject to comment by the Millan Committee. The MacLean Committee had concluded that the range of sentences available to the criminal courts in Scotland was suitable except in relation to a small number of offenders who posed a high and continuing risk to the public, for whom there should be a new sentence, the Order for Lifelong Restriction 20 . It felt that a small number of such offenders might have a mental disorder 21 as well, most likely a complex combination of forms of disorder, and suggested that such offenders should receive an OLR together with a hospital direction: this would mean that they would be detained in the high secure setting of the State Hospital and could be transferred to prison if treatment was no longer appropriate 22 .
The Millan Committee believed that capacity should be a central component of the process for authorising civil detention on the ground of mental disorder: its formulation was to require that the judgment of the patient be significantly impaired as a result of mental disorder 23 . It also gave consideration to the question of the approach to be taken in relation to offenders with mental disorder 24 , concluded that protecting the public from risk was a proper legislative object and identified the need for a framework that provided for "the range of legislative needs, including … protection of the public from those who may pose a risk to others" 25 , but it recommended that the criteria for detention through the criminal process should be the same as for civil detention 26 .
In relation to high risk offenders, the Millan Committee agreed with the MacLean Committee that some such offenders would have complex disorders, but also set out its view that others might have an untreated mental illness and would not pose a high risk after appropriate treatment, and so could be dealt with by way of the existing hospital order regime without any need for anything such as an OLR 27 . As had been the view of the Richardson Committee, the Millan Committee was content for the Restriction Order regime to continue 28 . It was also able to give brief consideration 29 to those who were unfit to stand trial because of their mental disorder -'insanity in bar of trial' 30 -and found to have committed the actus reus of the charge 31 ; and also those found fit to stand trial but to have been insane at the time of the offence and so not guilty by reason of insanity 32 . Such findings allowed the court to impose an appropriate order for either hospital or community care. The Committee noted that various practical problems had arisen, namely a lack of fit between the legal questions posed and the clinical understanding of these constructs, and delays in dealing with the cases in court because of difficulties in arranging the necessary medical evidence in a timely fashion. Their main conclusion was that the whole area, and the question of diminished responsibility as a partial defence to murder, should be subject to a full review by the Scottish Law Commission 33 . 
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One additional feature of the regime, which had recently proved controversial, had to be considered, the need to be satisfied as to the "treatability" of patients with personality disorders 34 . An order for discharge in a highly-publicised case where there was felt to be an ongoing risk to the public but the treatability requirement was not met 35 led to the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999, which required the detention of a restricted patient who did not meet the treatability test if detention was necessary to protect the public from serious harm 36 . The Millan Committee suggested that this test be removed, since the hospital system should be used only for those who could be treated: this approach allows the hospital system to be used where protecting the public coincides with the treatment of mental disorder, but protecting the public in other situations is a matter for the criminal justice system 37 .
(iii) The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003
The Scottish Parliament, which had been the first UK legislature to put in place a comprehensive framework in relation to adults without capacity - : the test for this order, which can be on an in-patient or out-patient basis, is set out in s64 and requires various findings, including that the patient's mental disorder leads to a significant impairment in the making of decisions about treatment and that treatment is necessary to avoid a significant risk to the patient or other others 40 . In other words, the Scottish Parliament has engaged with the principles that (i) capacity should be central, which means that those who retain the ability to make true decisions cannot be compelled, at least not in the civil setting; a decision is not a true one under the statutory test if there is a significant impairment to decision-making caused by the disorder; and (ii) danger posed to others is also a basis for intervention in the civil setting, but not as an alternative to the impaired capacity test, which has to be met in any event.
In the criminal justice setting, however, the changes introduced were less radical and did not go as far as the Millan Committee had recommended. The main order that can be made after conviction, the Compulsion Order, differs from a civil order in that there is no requirement that the defendant have any impaired capacity: what is needed 42 is that there is mental disorder, that treatment for the disorder is available, that the absence of treatment would result in a significant risk to the health, safety or welfare of the offender or the safety of another, and that the order is necessary. Of course, in determining whether an order is "necessary", a relevant factor might be whether or not the defendant has the capacity to make treatment decisions, since its absence might be a factor in favour of making the order. The Millan Committee's view that the criteria for a hospital order should be the same as those for a civil order, noted above, was rejected by the Scottish Executive, which stated in the Policy Memorandum accompanying the Bill that became the 2003 Act 43 :
"191. The civil criteria are designed to ensure that a patient is only placed under compulsion and deprived of their liberty when there are grounds for over-ruling the patient's autonomy. The forensic criteria are directed at ensuring that a court disposal and any continuing compulsion are appropriate, given all the circumstances of the offender's mental disorder and offence. We believe this difference is justified in the context of criminal disposals, where the alternative to a mental health order may be prison. The aim is to place the emphasis on the patient's need for appropriate care and treatment rather than on a person's willingness to accept the care and treatment. The intention is also that the criteria should not preclude voluntary transfer of prisoners to hospital under the Bill, when that is the most appropriate course of action.
The proposal to remove the effect of the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999
was also rejected: the legislation had by then been upheld by the Privy Council (and subsequently was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights) 44 .
(iv) The Mental Health Act 2001 and Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 -Ireland 45
In response to an admissibility decision in the European Court of Human Rights challenging the absence of an effective court review of detention 46 , the Oireachtas in Ireland passed the Mental Health Act 2001, which came into effect in 2006 47 . The Act's definition of "mental disorder" 48 , which is the key to the use of compulsion, requires "mental illness, severe dementia or significant intellectual disability" which (a) causes " … a serious likelihood of the person concerned causing immediate and serious harm to himself or herself or to other persons", or (b) is of a degree such that "the judgment of the person concerned is so impaired that failure to admit the person to an approved centre would be likely to lead to a serious deterioration in his or her condition or would prevent the administration of appropriate treatment that 
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could be given only by such admission", and admission would be beneficial 49 . Again, the legislature involved has placed lack of capacity as a central feature in the justification for detention, whilst also making harm to others an important matter. The 2001 Act does not have any provisions relating to orders made by the criminal courts in relation to mentally disordered offenders, though it does provide that a Tribunal must authorise the transfer of a civil patient to the secure Central Hospital (s21(2)).
Further legislation was passed to deal with the criminal justice sector, the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. This statute deals with fitness to stand trial, findings of not guilty by reason of insanity and also transfers of prisoners to hospital. Section 4, which sets the test for fitness to stand trial, allows an order for treatment in a designated centre 50 , but this requires a finding of "mental disorder" as defined in the 2001 Act; s5, relating to findings of insanity, is similar 51 . In relation to the transfer of prisonerssentenced or remand prisoners 52 -the provisions are, however, somewhat different 53 : the first relevant question is whether the prisoner has a "mental disorder for which he or she cannot be afforded appropriate care or treatment within the prison"; transfer is then possible if the prisoner "voluntarily consents" or if two or more doctors certify that the transfer should occur because the treatment cannot be provided. That allows the transfer to be effectuated "notwithstanding that the prisoner is unwilling or unable to voluntarily consent to the transfer". In summary, a patient found unfit to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity is treated as though he or she were a civil patient, with impaired judgment being a basis for detention; but a serving prisoner requires either agreement to transfer or two medical opinions in the absence of capacity or agreement if the prisoner has capacity.
(v) The Mental Health Act 2007
By the time, then, that the Westminster Parliament came to decide on the reform to the Mental Health Act 1983 for England and Wales, it had an expert committee recommendation on making capacity central, and further expert reports and models of legislation from other parts of the UK and from Ireland that suggested the importance in modern legislation of capacity. In addition, the Westminster Parliament had also put in place a framework to regulate the approach to adults with limited or no capacity, the consistent line from the Government was that capacity would not be made part of the test for detention and efforts to make it part of the test were rebuffed. Rather, the emphasis was on public safety or preventing self-harm. A few extracts from the lengthy process leading to reform give a flavour of the approach adopted.
The Green Paper of November 1999 that was published along with the Richardson Committee report called for views to be expressed on the recommendation that capacity be made central to the test for detention: but the Green Paper indicated 56 that "The principal concern about this approach is that it introduces a notion of capacity, which, in practice, may not be relevant to the final decision on whether a patient should be made subject to a compulsory order. It is the degree of risk that patients with mental disorder pose, to themselves or others, that is crucial to this decision. In the presence of such risk, questions of capacity -while still relevant to the plan of care and treatment -may be largely irrelevant to the question of whether or not a compulsory order should be made."
When the Draft Bill of 2004 was subject to pre-legislative scrutiny, the Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament recommended the adoption of the Scottish Parliament's approach of including impaired capacity as a precondition for detention 57 . The Government position had been set out to the Joint Committee, the reasons for objecting to capacity as a central component being 58 :
-it would not prevent harm to patients and others;
-professionals would have a very flexible approach to the test in order to ensure that people were treated;
-people with fluctuating capacity would receive inconsistent treatment and have periods of relapse and recovery;
-it would be impossible to treat under compulsion many people with personality disorders.
However, the Joint Committee felt that these difficulties could be overcome in practice and did not justify the position adopted by the Government 59 : put shortly -it was a necessary addition to ensure that the legislation covered only psychiatric conditions, in light of the very broad definition of mental disorder 60 , namely "an impairment of or a disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain resulting from any disability or disorder of the mind or brain"; since this could cover many physical and neurological disorders 61 ; the use of an impaired capacity test would answer concerns about the breadth of the proposed new regime; -it would approximate the test for best interests in what became the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and reduce the emphasis on risk (since the test for capacity takes into account the consequences of the decision) whilst allowing intervention without a discriminatory regime that makes a special case of mentally-ill people;
-it was inconsistent to ignore capacity and autonomy in relation to the criteria for detention but make it central in relation to other areas, such as ECT 62 or psychosurgery 63 .
The Government issued a formal response to the Joint Committee's Report 64 , and rejected most of its recommendations, including those in relation to the impaired capacity test, noting "it is not safe to assume that there is a link between the severity of a condition -and therefore the need for treatmentand the person's ability to make decisions" 65 .
When a Bill was finally introduced into Parliament in 2006, the House of Lords did add a clause making it a precondition for civil detention (either for assessment under s2 or treatment under s3 of the 1983 Act) that "because of his mental disorder, his ability to make decisions about the provision of medical treatment is significantly impaired" 66 . The central arguments in favour that featured in the debate were: (i) decision-making capacity was central in relation to other forms of medical treatment, and should be central in relation to mental health because there was no great contrast in terms of ability to participate 67 ; it was part of good professional practice in any event, including in mental health work, was part of the test as to detention in Scotland (where it did not seem to be causing a problem), and in the English legislation was already relevant in relation to decisions about medication beyond three months and ECT 68 and psychosurgery 69 ; (ii) allowing people to retain some decision-making capacity about their treatment would make them more likely to present themselves; and for those placed in the mental health system, there would be more compliance because the loss of the ability to make decisions was a source of frustration and could lead to non-compliance and a position of opposition to the clinicians who were viewed as having an "upper hand" in a relationship and not taking the views of patients seriously; in other words, it would promote confidence in the system by users 70 , which would raise the prospects of it being successful; (iii) assessment of capacity was to become a matter required on a daily basis with the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and making it a necessary focus for mental health clinicians would enable them to identify patients who did not recognise their own illness, who might present the most serious risk. The only opposition to this amendment in the debate came from the Government minister in charge of taking the Bill through the House of Lords, Lord Hunt 71 , who commented that " [t] he primary purpose of the legislation is to protect people from the harm that may be caused by mental disorder" and as such was to be contrasted with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which was designed "to provide a way of intervening where people cannot make their own decisions". The question of compulsion turned on "the needs of patients and the risk that their disorder poses to themselves and to others, not their decision-making ability" and an impaired decision-making test "could result in some patients going untreated and thereby harming themselves or others" 72 ; this -leaving people to harm themselves or commit a crime they would not otherwise commit -was not something that promoted autonomy, whereas treating people so that they could recover from serious mental disorder would allow them better to operate autonomously. He restated the previously-indicated position that medical professionals would misreport impaired capacity in order to ensure treatment, and that the test would cause the premature discharge of patients who regained their capacity before their treatment was complete and who would then have to be discharged to deteriorate again. Moreover, he did not accept that reluctant patients would be more likely to comply if the preconditions for compulsion included an impaired decision-making clause. The Government majority in the House of Commons reversed the impaired capacity clause inserted by the House of Lords: this was done at the Committee stage of the Bill. Though the issue took up one and a half of the 12 sittings of the Committee, the arguments were along the same lines as those presented in the Lords, with one side emphasising risk and the other emphasising autonomy and the need to avoid discrimination as between physical and mental illness. The vote was along party lines 73 .
Accordingly, the question of capacity is not relevant to the test for detention under the civil provisions for England and Wales, except in an indirect fashion: the White Paper of December 2000, for example, noted that the question of whether the nature and degree of the disorder required detention would include consideration of the question of the patient's capacity to make relevant decisions 74 . With no apparent realisation as to the juxtaposition, capacity was however central in another element of the new regime. Consent to treatment for a 16-18 year old could be given by his or her parents. The White Paper suggested that, in part because of "the increasing recognition of the capacity of a developing young person to take decisions", it should be made clear that the absence of consent from that group would require the use of compulsory powers rather than any reliance on parental powers to consent 75 : this became law under the 2007 Act 76 . In other words, questions of capacity are of vital importance in determining who could give consent for an informal admission, but in a non-consensual admission capacity was only of tangential relevance in light of its potential to affect the assessment of the nature or degree of the disorder.
At no stage in the process of reform did capacity on the part of those in the criminal justice system become a central feature. There were, rather, a number of reasons given as to why those who entered the mental health system via the criminal courts should be subject to differential treatment involving less stringent conditions. For example, when the Joint Committee was considering the Draft Bill of 2004, it recommended that the criteria for detention include a requirement that the disorder be of a nature or 
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degree to make treatment appropriate irrespective of whether the defendant would consent to treatment 77 . The Government position was that the civil criterion that voluntary treatment was not possible had to be omitted because otherwise a patient willing to attend hospital voluntarily would have to be subject to a prison sentence 78 . Also missing was any requirement that treatment be necessary to protect the patient or others from harm: the Government position was that this pre-condition was justified in relation to a civil patient as the basis for depriving the patient of his or her liberty, whereas in the criminal setting the justification arose from the fact that a court order was made; and the danger of including a criterion reflecting the need to protect someone from themselves was that this could be met by a prison sentence 79 .
(vi) The Bamford Review -Northern Ireland Order defines mental disorder as "mental illness, mental handicap and any other disorder or disability of mind" but expressly excludes those whose only diagnosis is of a "personality disorder". The criteria for detention for treatment, as set in Art 12, require an opinion that the absence of detention involves "a substantial likelihood of serious physical harm to himself or to other persons". In relation to detention ordered by the criminal courts, Art 44(2) allows a hospital order if there is "mental illness or severe mental impairment of a nature or degree which warrants his detention in hospital for medical treatment" and the order is the more suitable disposal.
The message of the Bamford Review was that the 1986 Order had significant gaps, and it suggested that the opportunity be taken to provide a comprehensive legislative framework based on a number of central principles. The Committee set out four over-arching principles that provided a "sound ethical basis for legislation" and "recognise and support the dignity of the person", namely 81 :
"i. -Autonomy -respecting the person's capacity to decide and act on his own and his right not to be subject to restraint by others.
ii. -Justice -applying the law fairly and equally.
iii. -Benefit -promoting the health, welfare and safety of the person, while having regard to the safety of others.
iv. -Least Harm -acting in a way that minimises the likelihood of harm to the person."
The Committee's preference was for one legal framework that dealt with all issues arising in relation to capacity and mental health which "should apply in a non-discriminatory way to both physical and mental health decisions, as well as to welfare and financial needs" 82 . In other words, the separate area of law relating to mental health law should become a sub-set of the law relating to what happens when someone has a loss of capacity to act autonomously. Capacity law should develop and incorporate mental health law "whilst ensuring appropriate protections" 83 ; practical arrangements would be put in place for the
